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Dr. Martin Pollrich

**** Currently on parental leave ****


University of Bonn

Lennéstr. 37Martin Pollrich

53113 Bonn


Office: 1st floor

Tel: +49 228 73 7942

Mail: martin.pollrich(at)


Curriculum Vitae



 "Mediated Audits", Rand Journal of Economics 2017, Vol 48(1), pp. 44-68

 "Imprecise Information Disclosure and Truthful Certification", (joint with Lilo Wagner),  European Economic Review 2016, Vol 89, pp. 345--360


Working Papers:

- "Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations" (joint with Colin von Negenborn)

"Unobservable Investment, limited commitment and the curse of firm relocation" (joint with Robert C. Schmidt), (former title: "Incentive contracts to avert firm relocation")

"The Maximum Punishment Principle and Precision of Audits under Limited Commitment"

"Sequential Procurement with Limited Commitment" (joint with Vitali Gretschko and Nicolas Fugger)

"Incomplete Contracts in Dynamic Procurement" (joint with Vitali Gretschko)

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