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Deniz Dizdar

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Département de sciences économiques

Université de Montréal

C.P. 6128 succ. Centre-Ville

Montréal, Québec

Canada, H3C 3J7


E-mail: [Email protection active, please enable JavaScript.]


I have joined the Department of Economics at the University of Montréal as assistant professor in june 2014.

Curriculum Vitae

My CV is available for download here.


Main Research and Teaching Interests

Microeconomics, Information Economics, Mechanism Design, Matching.



Dizdar, D., A. Gershkov, and B. Moldovanu (2011): "Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem", Theoretical Economics 6, 157-184.


Job Market Paper

Two-sided investments and matching with multi-dimensional types and attributes.


I study settings in which heterogeneous buyers and sellers, characterized by cost types, must invest in attributes before they compete for partners in a frictionless, continuum assignment market. I define Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite's (2001) notion of ex-post contracting equilibrium in a general assignment game framework. Ex-ante efficient investment and matching can always be supported in equilibrium. The main part of the paper sheds light on what enables and what precludes coordination failures resulting in mismatch of agents (from an ex-ante perspective) and/or pairwise inefficient investments. A kind of technological multiplicity is the key source of potential inefficiencies. Absence of technological multiplicity rules out pairwise inefficient investments, and it heavily constrains mismatch in multi-dimensional environments with differentiated agents. An example with simultaneous under- and over-investment shows that even extreme exogenous heterogeneity may not suffice to rule out inefficient equilibria in environments with technological multiplicity.


Other Research Papers

Surplus Division and Efficient Matching (joint with Benny Moldovanu).


We study a transferable utility two-sided matching model with a finite number of agents who are characterized by privately known attributes that jointly determine the surplus of each potential partnership. We ask the following question: for what divisions of surplus within matched pairs is it possible to design a mechanism that determines additional payments when agents compete for partners under incomplete information and induces information revelation leading to an efficient (surplus-maximizing) matching? Our main result shows that the only robust rules compatible with efficient matching are those that divide realized surplus in a fixed proportion, independently of the attributes of the pair's members: to enable efficient match formation in cases with complementary, multi-dimensional attributes, it is necessary that each agent expects to get the same fixed percentage of surplus in every conceivable match. A more permissive result is obtained for one-dimensional attributes and supermodular surplus functions.

On the optimality of small research tournaments.


This note examines two open problems concerning the optimal number of participants in the research tournament model of Fullerton and McAfee (1999). I derive a sharp bound for the possible cost inefficiency associated with a tournament of size 2 for the case in which (asymmetric) effort costs are common knowledge and the procurer can charge non-discriminatory entry fees. The result generally supports arranging a small tournament with the two most efficient firms, with some notable exceptions. If, prior to the tournament, costs are private information of ex-ante symmetric firms, Fullerton and McAfee's contestant selection auction has to be used to select the most efficient candidates and to raise money in advance. I discuss the procurer's problem of stimulating a given expected aggregate research effort at lowest expected total cost by choosing the optimal tournament size. A closed form solution is derived for the case where marginal costs are uniformly distributed. The result strongly favors the smallest possible tournament.

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