

Syllabus Micro II (Ph.D.) - SS 2017

Instructors: Benny Moldovanu, Martin Pollrich

1. Introduction to Social Choice and Mechanism Design
2. The mechanism design problem and incentive compatibility with quasi-linear utility
3. Bayesian and dominant strategy incentive compatibility
4. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and budget balance
5. Bilateral trade with private values
6. Optimal Auctions
7. Multidimensional mechanism design
8. Interdependent values and ex-post incentive compatibility
9. Dynamic mechanism design
10. Optimal mechanism design without money
11. Two-sided matching

Literature:

Mas-Collel, Whinston Green: Microeconomic Theory, Chapter 23

Borgers: Intro. to the Theory of Mechanism Design

Roth, Sotomayor: Two-Sided Matching

Gershkov, Moldovanu: Dynamic Allocation and Pricing